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Hang Seng School of Commerce, Hong Kong 
 
Abstract 
This paper updates and extends the study of Chan et al. (2006) by investigating whether regional differences 
in the political and institutional environment in China have a significant impact on auditor reporting behavior. 
Adopting a within-country setting, which precludes cross-country confounding factors, we find that in 
regions with a low level of institutional development, local auditors are more likely than non-local auditors to 
issue standard unqualified opinions to listed companies controlled by local governments. In addition, 
compared with local auditors in institutionally strong regions, those in institutionally weak regions are more 
likely to issue unqualified opinions to these companies. We also find that companies in institutionally weak 
regions that switch to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion can succeed in opinion shopping. The 
results have implications for legislators and regulators in China and other transitional economies, foremost 
among which is that improvement in institutional structures is essential for countries striving to build a 
credible independent auditing profession. 
 
Keywords 





Recent studies that use cross-country research settings suggest that economic, political, legal, and 
accounting institutions are key determinants of financial market development, corporate-ownership 
structure, and properties of accounting information around the world (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Ball et 
al. 2003; Francis et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003). However, scholars argue that such studies may suffer 
from the effects of country-specific factors such as accounting rules and regulations, differences in 
infrastructure and culture, a small sample size, and potential endogeneity problems (e.g., Miller 
2004; Schultz and Lopez 2001). Chan et al. (2006) examine auditor reporting behavior in China from 
1996 to 2002 and find that Chinese local auditors are inclined to report favorably on their local 
government-owned clients. However, they do not examine regional variations. To avoid cross-
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country confounding factors and extend the work of Chan et al. (2006), we focus on a single country 
to examine whether regional variations in institutional development affect the opinion decisions of 
auditors on Chinese listed companies during the 1996–2007 period. Specifically, we investigate 
whether in regions with a low level of institutional development Chinese local auditors are more 
likely than non-local ones to render standard unqualified opinions to listed state-owned enterprises 
controlled by local governments hereafter, local SOEs, and whether local auditors in institutionally 
weak regions are more likely than those in institutionally strong regions to issue unqualified audit 
reports to local SOEs. 
 
We separate the sample into regions that are institutionally weak and those that are institutionally 
strong based on the widely used NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces, which was 
published by the National Economic Research Institute NERI for the sample period (e.g., Fan and 
Wang 2001, 2003, 2004; Fan et al. 2007). The index is an assessment of the level of market 
development of China’s provinces and regions and contains five sub-indexes. We use three sub-
indexes, namely the degree of government influence in the local economy, the development of the 
financial market, and the intermediate and legal framework, to study their combined effect on 
auditor reporting behavior (we give details of these measures in the next section). We choose these 
sub-indexes because they collectively capture the underlying features of the institutional 
environment of a province or region, and have been found to affect auditor-choice decisions (e.g., 
Wang et al. 2008). In institutionally weak regions, the local economy is likely to be subject to political 
interference and suffer from an underdeveloped financial market and legal environment. We define 
an audit firm as local if it is located in the same province as the client and more than half of total 
client assets come from the same jurisdiction as the audit firm, and we consider a listed company to 
be a local SOE if the largest shareholder is a local government entity that owns at least 20 percent of 
the shares outstanding (e.g., Chan et al. 2006). 
 
China’s stock and audit markets have been subject to strong government influence since they 
emerged. This is because historically local governments controlled both listed companies and audit 
firms in China (e.g., Tang 1999). Therefore, controlling government entities commonly exerted 
administrative power to appoint the audit firms that they sponsored to audit the companies that 
they owned (e.g., Chan et al. 2006; Yang et al. 2001). Since 1995, China has adopted a series of 
measures to build a credible auditing profession, which include the promulgation of new 
independent auditing standards, the disaffiliation of audit firms from their sponsoring government 
agencies, and the inducement of audit-firm mergers. However, these measures have been only 
partially successful. For example, the adoption of new auditing standards has actually resulted in a 
flight from audit quality, and the close ties between audit firms and their former government 
sponsors have not yet been completely severed (e.g., Chan et al. 2006; DeFond et al. 2000; Yang et al. 
2001). At present, local governments still control the majority of listed companies in China, which 
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serve as the main clientele for many local auditors. This makes local auditors politically vulnerable. 
The enforcement of laws across China is different because of regional differences in the development 
of the legal infrastructure and level of marketization. In regions where the underlying institutional 
features of market development are not firmly in place to discipline participants, audit collusion is 
likely to occur. We expect that such collusion is most likely to occur between local SOEs and local 
auditors in regions with a low level of institutional development because the two groups enjoy a 
close relationship and share common interests. Therefore, we hypothesize that in institutionally 
weak regions, local auditors are more likely than non-local ones to issue standard unqualified audit 
opinions to local SOEs, and local auditors in institutionally weak regions are more likely than those 
in institutionally strong regions to issue unqualified opinions to these companies. This situation is, 
in a way, parallel to the familiarity threat that affects auditor independence. 
 
Based on 10,481 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007, our univariate and multivariate results 
support the hypotheses. To confirm our main findings, we also examine the type of audit opinions 
that local auditors render to local SOEs in the year following their receipt of a qualified opinion and 
the subsequent change in auditor. We find that in institutionally weak regions, companies that 
receive a qualified opinion and subsequently switch to a local auditor are more likely to be 
successful in obtaining a clean audit opinion than if they switch to a non-local auditor. These 
findings contribute to the existing audit literature on the effects of government ownership and 
institutions on the reporting behavior of Chinese local auditors. Chan et al. (2006) find that 
politically vulnerable local auditors have incentives to report leniently and favorably on local 
government-owned companies. Extending this finding, we find that it is the combination of local 
auditor, government ownership, and weak institutional environment that results in more lenient 
auditor reports. This study also complements auditor choice research conducted in China (e.g., Chan 
et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2008. Chan et al. 2007) find that a decrease in government shares leads to a 
general increase in the demand for higher quality audits in China’s stock market. Wang et al. (2008) 
find that SOEs are more likely than non-state firms to hire small local auditors in regions with a 
lower level of institutional development. While Wang et al. (2008) focus on the demand side of 
auditing, we examine the reporting behavior of local versus non-local auditors (i.e., the supply side). 
We also examine audit opinions rendered after auditor switches to supplement our findings. Our 
results indicate that the lenient reporting behavior of local auditors induces local SOEs to use their 
services. 
 
As explained earlier, over the years the Chinese government has implemented measures to induce 
the demand for and supply of quality audit services. Our results suggest that this twofold objective 
cannot be achieved simply by the mandating of accounting and auditing standards and regulations. 
Parallel development in market institutions, the legal system, and the accounting infrastructure, 
together with the reform of corporate governance practices and ownership structure, is necessary to 
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improve the quality of audit and financial reporting. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the institutional background 
in China for the purpose of hypothesis development. Section III outlines the research methodology 
and explains the sample selection. Section IV presents the empirical findings and discusses the 
results. Section V concludes the study. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In this section, we first describe the NERI index, which we use to classify regions. We then explain 
how marketization varies across regions in China. Finally, we hypothesize how these variations may 
affect auditor reporting behavior. 
 
Marketization of China’s Provinces 
To measure the level of market development of China’s provinces and regions, Fan and Wang 2001 
compiled substantive statistics and published them in a work entitled The National Economic 
Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces: 2000 Report, which covers 
the 1997–98 period. So far, four reports of the same kind have been published that cover the years 
from 1997 to 2005 (e.g., Fan and Wang 2001, 2003, 2004; Fan et al. 2007). The index contains five 
equally weighted sub-indexes, reflecting development in the 1 non-state enterprise sector, 2 
commodity market, 3 factor market, 4 intermediate and legal framework, and 5 government 
influence in the market. The first sub-index contains three indicators—non-state shares in industrial 
output, investment in fixed assets, and urban employment—while the second sub-index includes 
two—market pricing in retail sales of consumer goods, capital goods, and farm products and local-
trade protection. To measure institutional environment, we use the last three sub-indexes because 
they collectively capture the main attributes of a province’s market development and are found to 
affect the choice of auditors in China (e.g., Wang et al. 2008). We give a more detailed account of 
these three measures below. 
 
Government Influence in the Market 
This sub-index is constructed based on the following information: 1 government allocation of 
resources ratio of a provincial government’s budgetary expenses to its gross domestic products, 2 
government intervention in the business measured by the time spent by entrepreneurs in dealing 
with bureaucrats, 3 size of the government ratio of government employees to the provincial 
population, 4 non-tax burden of enterprises e.g., the share of sales spent on gifts or bribes to 
government agencies, and 5 tax and non-tax burdens of farmers. Provinces and major municipalities 
are ranked based on these dimensions, and the higher is the score, the lower is the degree of local 
government intervention in a province or region. According to the index, the score of eastern regions 
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is twice that of western regions. The varying extent of government intervention in local economies 
is a significant factor in China’s institutional heterogeneity. In general, in coastal cities, local 
governments are more firmly controlled by laws and regulations and implement market-oriented 
policies rather than issuing discretionary administrative instructions (e.g., Ni 2002). 
 
Factor Market Development 
This sub-index comprises five indicators. The first two relate to the development of the financial 
market, which is measured by the level of deposits in non-state financial institutions as the share of 
total deposits in the banking sector and the share of bank loans credited to non-state enterprises. 
The other three indicators consider foreign direct investment, labor mobility, and technology 
development. This sub-index reveals a great disparity among different regions in these five 
dimensions. In general, in coastal cities, firms have more opportunities to raise capital. Creditmarket 
development across regions in China has been uneven, with rapid development in the eastern 
provinces and relatively slow development elsewhere. Jin and Qian (1998) find that in areas with a 
lower level of market development, firms that are more closely affiliated with local governments 
enjoy more credit advantages. 
 
Intermediate and Legal Environment 
This sub-index considers the share of public accountants and lawyers of the local population, legal 
environment for businesses as perceived by corporate executives, protection of intellectual property 
rights in terms of patent applications and research and development R&D grants, and protection of 
consumer rights. The index indicates that China’s legal environment is neither well nor uniformly 
developed in spite of the government’s efforts to improve the legal system. Specialist lawyers and 
reputable law firms are located mainly in the politically and economically developed centers and 
coastal cities. In the western regions, it is quite difficult to gain access to specialized legal services, 
especially in rural areas (e.g., Chen 2005). 
 
Research Hypotheses 
Prior studies show that the institutional environment affects financial reporting practices. For 
example, Ball et al. 2003 find that in more developed markets, information asymmetry is more 
efficiently resolved through public disclosure and there is a greater demand for high-quality audits. 
Francis et al. (2003) and Choi and Wong (2007) document that countries with a poor legal 
environment generally demand lower-quality audits than do those with a strong legal environment. 
Chan et al. (2006) find that, because of their political and economic influence over auditor reporting 
decisions, local governments often prefer to use local auditors as the auditors of companies that they 
own. 
 
Whether the reporting behavior of Chinese local auditors is uniform across regions with different 
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levels of institutional development has yet to be determined. This study takes advantage of the large 
cross-regional disparity in institutional development within a single country to examine this issue. 
We expect that the variation in the level of institutional development across regions of China will be 
matched by a corresponding variation in the extent of the leniency of the reporting decisions of local 
auditors. Specifically, based on the foregoing discussion, we posit that in institutionally weak 
regions where government intervention in the local economy is heavy, the credit market is 
underdeveloped, and the legal environment is poor, there is a lack of demand for and supply of 
quality auditing. 
 
Baiman et al. 1991 suggest that for collusion to occur, colluding parties must have interests in 
common, and collusion costs must be low. As noted, the institutional environment in China gives 
SOE managers and local auditors incentives to collude. On the one hand, local SOEs have incentives 
to hire local auditors because of the local government’s political power over them to facilitate their 
initial and subsequent public offerings (e.g., Aharony et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Yuan 
2004). On the other hand, politically vulnerable local auditors have incentives to report favorably on 
local government-controlled companies because of their significant economic dependence on them 
(e.g., Chan et al. 2006). As local SOEs and local auditors have interests in common, they have 
incentives to abide by a self-enforcing collusive agreement to protect their own interests. Local SOEs 
and local auditors also find that their collusion is cost-effective because they both enjoy political 
patronage that can shield them from the consequences of being caught. Further, collusion costs are 
lower in regions where the legal environment is poor, costly litigation is rare, and the enforcement 
mechanism is weak. Although collusion can also occur between other parties e.g., between local 
auditors and other companies or between non-local auditors and local SOEs and in regions with a 
high level of institutional development, the likelihood is lower, because potential partners are 
neither politically nor economically dependent on one another, have no direct control over one 
another, and face higher collusion costs. Therefore, we propose the following two hypotheses that 
focus on the behavior of local auditors: 
 
H1: When the institutional environment is weak, local auditors are more likely than non-local 
auditors to issue standard unqualified opinions to local SOEs. 
H2: Compared to local auditors in a strong institutional environment, local auditors in a weak 
institutional environment are more likely to issue standard unqualified opinions to local SOEs. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Sample Data 
The sample initially included 10,594 non-financial firm-year observations for the 1996–2007 period. 
We start in 1996, as China’s independent auditing standards came into effect that year. Previously, 
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qualified audit opinions and auditor switching were rare, but they have both increased substantially 
since then (e.g., Chan et al. 2006). We retrieve information about auditor identity, audit opinion, 
client firm characteristics, and share ownership from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) and Wind databases. We identify auditor change by ascertaining whether the 
same auditor audited the company in both years, and treat as a non-change unavoidable auditor 
change resulting from either a license suspension of the previous auditor due to irregularities or a 
merger of the incumbent auditor with other auditors. We exclude 66 firm-years in Tibet for which 
there is no market development index, 25 observations for which the ROE is outside the (+100, -100) 
range, and 22 observations without data on client firm characteristics. The final sample includes 
10,481 observations. 
 
To classify regions as institutionally weak or strong, we use the NERI Index of Marketization of 
China’s Provinces that covers nine years from 1997 to 2005 (e.g., Fan and Wang 2001, 2003, 2004; Fan 
et al. 2007). We average the scores over the period for the three sub-indexes and label provinces with 
marks above below the median as institutionally strong (weak) regions.1 Alternative classifications 
are discussed in robustness testing. Because the purpose of this research is to determine the overall 
effect of the institutional environment, we combine the three NERI subindexes. This approach is 
reasonable, as these sub-indexes are likely to capture similar underlying institutional features, and 
each sub-index is very stable over time. Nevertheless, we also use three sub-index variables in our 
robustness tests. We define as qualified audit opinions qualified, disclaimer, and adverse opinions, 
and unqualified opinions with an explanatory paragraph (e.g., Chan et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2001). 
Following Chan et al. (2006), we treat a listed company as a local SOE if its largest shareholder is a 
local government entity that owns at least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding and consider an 
auditor to be local if it is located in the same province as the client, and more than 50 percent of the 
total assets of its clients are owned by clients in the same province as the auditor. According to this 
classification system, local SOEs and local auditors account for 63 percent and 76 percent, 
respectively, of the full sample. 
 
Table 1 presents the by-year distribution of audit opinion types and auditor changes. The table shows 
that 9.7 percent of listed companies received a qualified audit opinion over the sample period and 
that the percentage of companies receiving qualified opinions in institutionally weak regions is 
                                                     
1 The ranking of provinces and regions from the highest to the lowest averaged score is Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, 
Beijing, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, Hebei, Fujian, Liaoning, Chongqing, Hainan, Anhui, Guangxi, Jilin, Henan, 
Sichuan, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shaan’xi, Shanxi, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, and Qinghai. The median values for strong and weak institutional regions are 6.28 and 4.46, respectively. Only 
Sichuan and Hubei move up while Guangxi and Jilin move down if the classification is based on the averaged scores 
over the period 1997–2005 for all five sub-indexes. 
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lower than that in institutionally strong regions 8.4 percent versus 10.2 percent, respectively. The 
table also shows that 10.4 percent of companies changed their auditors during the sample period 
(1996–2007). 
 
Regression Model Specifications 
To test the reporting behavior of local versus non-local auditors in different scenarios H1, we divide 
the sample into 2 x 2 (weak versus strong institutions and SOEs versus other companies) groups and 
then run four separate logistic regressions using the follow model: 
The dependent variable, OP, takes a value of 1 if a company receives a qualified audit opinion. The 
variable of interest in the model is Local, a dummy variable coded 1 for a local auditor and 0 
otherwise. This variable directly tests whether local and non-local auditors differ in their reporting 
decisions in four different situations. If local auditors are more likely than non-local ones to issue 
standard unqualified opinions to local SOEs, then the coefficient of this variable will be negative. 
We control for the effects of client firm characteristics on audit opinions as follows. First, we 
introduce an indicator variable, Top-10 (= 1 for a Top-10 auditor based on total client assets), to 
control for the effect of auditor size on the type of audit opinion issued (e.g., DeAngelo 1981), and 
expect Top-10 auditors to be more likely to issue qualified reports e.g., Chan et al. 2006. Second, we 
use Size as a proxy for client size by taking the natural logarithm of the client firm’s year-end total 
assets, and ROE return on equity to measure profitability by taking the net income over the year-
end total owners’ equity. We expect both variables to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
receiving qualified audit opinions because larger, profitable companies tend to be financially stable 
and thus are less likely to manipulate accounting numbers. Third, we include the debt-to-equity ratio 
Debt and the current ratio CURR to control for the leverage level and the financial liquidity of the 
companies and expect companies with greater leverage and lower liquidity to be more likely to 
receive qualified opinions. Fourth, we use RECV accounts receivable over total assets and INV 
inventory over total assets to account for audit risk and client complexity, respectively, and expect 
the coefficients of these variables to have positive signs. Fifth, we include Age number of years that 
the client firm has been listed and Loss (= 1 if a client firm reports losses for two consecutive years 
preceding the year of the audit) to respectively control for the effects of raising additional capital 
and delisting avoidance incentives affecting the probability of receiving qualified audit reports, and 
expect both variables to have positive coefficients in the logistic model. Sixth, as foreign investors 
may bring in new management methods and better internal control systems that could reduce the 
likelihood of receiving qualified opinions, we include B-share (=1 if a company issued B-shares) in 
the model. Finally, we control for industry and time series effects on the frequency of qualified 
opinions.  
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To test the likelihood that local auditors will issue unqualified opinions to local SOEs in 
institutionally weak versus strong regions H2, we restrict the sample to companies audited by local 
auditors. We then divide this sample into two groups local SOEs and other companies and run 
separate logistic regressions for each group using the following model: 
The dependent variable is as previously defined. The variable of interest in this model is INST, a 
dummy variable coded 1 if audit firms operate in regions with a low level of institutional 
development, and 0 otherwise. We expect the sign of the coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
All of the control variables are as previously defined. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate and Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of client firm characteristics partitioned by institution, 
ownership type, and auditor locale. Overall, the size of local auditors and their clients is smaller in 
institutionally weak regions compared with those in institutionally strong regions. Further, it 
appears that clients of local auditors in institutionally weak regions are financially weaker in terms 
of ROE and losses compared with clients of local or non-local auditors in institutionally strong 
regions. 
 
Before running the multivariate regressions on audit opinions, we first perform univariate tests to 
see whether audit opinion type is associated with auditor locale in four scenarios representing firm 
ownership and institutional development at two levels, and report the Chi-square test results in 
Panels A–D of Table 3. The results in Panel A indicate that in institutionally weak regions, local 
auditors are significantly more likely than non-local ones to issue standard unqualified opinions to 
local SOEs (93.9 percent versus 87.7 percent, respectively, χ2 = 12.159, p = 0.000). However, there is 
no significant difference between these two groups of auditors with respect to the likelihood of 
issuing clean opinions to companies that are not controlled by local governments 89.3 percent versus 
87.4 percent, respectively, χ2 = 0.421, p = 0.517, Panel B. Further, there is also no evidence that in 
strong institutional environments, the reporting behavior of local auditors is significantly different 
from non-local ones in their treatment of local SOEs or other companies Panels C and D. 
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The lower half of Table 3 presents the results of logistic regressions corresponding to the four 
situations identified for the Chi-square tests. As predicted by H1 and indicated by the significant 
negative coefficient of the Local variable (Panel A), local auditors in institutionally weak regions 
have significantly higher probabilities of issuing clean opinions to local SOEs than have non-local 
auditors. However, there is no significant difference between local and non-local auditors in other 
scenarios (Panels B–D). Although the univariate test results indicate that local auditors in regions 
with a better institutional environment seem to have (marginally) lower probabilities of issuing 
clean opinions to local SOEs than their counterparts, the multivariate test results, after controlling 
for other factors expected to affect opinions, do not suggest any significant difference (Panel C). 
Consistent with prior studies, we also find that in general, large companies are less likely to receive 
qualified reports, whereas less financially secure companies (i.e., lower ROE, higher leverage, and 
loss making) are more likely to do so (Chan et al. 2006). 
 
We also examine the type of subsequent audit opinions received by the 165 companies that switched 
auditors in the year immediately following their receipt of a qualified audit opinion. The upper part 
of Table 4 presents the Chi-square test results, which parallel those presented in Table 3. Although 
the statistical power of the Chi-square test is limited by the scarcity of the observations in each panel, 
the supplemental results are consistent with the main results reported in Table 3 Panel A. 
 
To increase the statistical power, we run only two separate logistic regressions for the institutionally 
weak and strong region sub-groups (unlike the case in Table 3). We introduce an interaction variable, 
Local * LocSOE, to examine the propensity of local versus non-local auditors to issue clean opinions 
to SOEs. The significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that following the 
receipt of a qualified opinion and subsequent auditor switching, local SOEs have a greater 
probability of obtaining a subsequent clean opinion from local versus non-local auditors in regions 
with poor institutional development. 
 
Univariate and Multivariate Tests of Hypothesis 2 
To supplement H1, we examine the reporting behavior of local auditors in institutionally weak 
versus strong regions. As before, we conduct the Chi-square test for preliminary univariate analysis. 
As predicted by H2, local auditors in institutionally weak regions are significantly more likely than 
those in institutionally strong regions to issue unqualified opinions to local SOEs (93.9 percent 
versus 89.2 percent, respectively, χ2 = 25.94, p = 0.000, Panel A, Table 5). 
 
To provide more convincing evidence, we also perform multivariate analysis. The significantly 
negative coefficient of the INST variable indicates that the lenient reporting behavior of local 
auditors with regard to local SOEs is more prevalent in regions with a weak (versus strong) 
institutional environment. Together with the corroborating evidence provided in Table 3, the results 
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consistently suggest that the reporting behavior of local auditors is conditional upon the level of 
market development of the region in which they operate. The number of control variables that are 
significant and the significance level of these variables are generally similar to those reported in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 6 Panel A presents the type of subsequent audit opinions received by the 117 companies that 
switched to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion in the prior year. Again, we find more 
unqualified opinions for local SOEs that use local auditors in weak (versus strong) institutional 
regions (68.8 percent versus 36.9 percent, χ2 = 3.661, p = 0.058). 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the logistic regression results of subsequent opinions for the 117 post-
switchers following their receipt of a qualified opinion. Again, to increase the statistical power, we 
include all client firms (local SOEs and others) in the regression model. As expected, LocSOE * INST 
is significant with a negative coefficient, which indicates that in a weaker institutional environment, 
local SOEs are significantly more likely to receive a clean opinion if they switch to a local (versus 
non-local) auditor after receiving a qualified opinion. 
 
Robustness Testing 
We perform the following secondary analyses to check the robustness of the main results to 
alternative definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables. First, we adopt the following 
alternatives to classify regions into institutionally weak or strong. We use the mean, rather than the 
median, index values. We also separately use two yearly indexes, 1999 and 2001, which respectively 
represent the midpoint of the sample period of Chan et al. 2006 and the current study. We also use 
the more recent indexes 2002–05. In addition, we delete five provinces immediately above and below 
the median mean of the marketization index i.e., examine only the top and bottom ten provinces. 
Second, we employ a continuous rather than an indicator variable to measure the level of 
marketization. Third, we test each of the three sub-index variables in the regression rather than 
combining them. Fourth, we treat an audit firm as a local firm if the firm resides in the same 
jurisdiction as the client and more than 50 percent of the total number of its clients rather than total 
client assets come from the same jurisdiction as the audit firm e.g., Chan et al. 2006. Fifth, we use 30 
percent and 40 percent cutoffs, respectively, to determine the controlling ownership of a listed 
company. Finally, instead of treating an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph as a 
qualified opinion, we exclude companies that received this type of opinion from the sample. The 
additional untabulated test results point to a single conclusion: lenient reporting by local auditors 
on local SOEs occurs in institutionally weak regions.2 
  
                                                     
2 The results of robustness testing are available upon request. 
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Taking advantage of the great cross-regional disparity in China’s economic, legal, and institutional 
development, we use a sample of 10,481 firm-year observations over the 1996–2007 period to 
document how this disparity affects the reporting behavior of local auditors with regard to local 
government-owned companies. While confirming the findings of Chan et al. 2006, we extend their 
study by showing that the likelihood of local auditors reporting favorably on their local government-
owned clients varies significantly with the quality of the institutional environment in which these 
auditors operate. Both our primary and secondary results indicate that it is the combination of local 
auditor, government ownership, and weak institutional environment that results in more lenient 
auditor reporting. These results suggest that when the underlying institutional attributes of the 
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market environment are not in place to discipline auditors, audit quality may be compromised as 
the benefits of acquiescing to client requests outweigh the potential penalties arising from audit 
failures. 
 
Over the years, the Chinese government has implemented a number of measures to improve auditor 
independence. Our findings suggest that micro-level measures are useful but not sufficient. 
Regulators in China and other transitional markets who wish to develop a credible independent 
auditing profession would find it beneficial to expend resources to improve institutions nationwide 
by considering government’s role in business, legal and accounting infrastructures, corporate 
governance, and firm ownership diversification. The current financial crisis has led to an observable 
rise in government intervention in economies around the world which may be necessary in light of 
inadequate financial regulations in the past years. While the nature of such intervention is different 
from the intervention discussed herein, there are similarities in terms of government ownership of 
firms and government influence of management practices. Our research results indicate that the 
potential pitfalls of government intervention including auditor misreporting should not be 
underestimated in a weak institutional environment. 
 
We note the following limitations of the study’s findings, each of which provides a possible avenue 
of future inquiries. First, although we control for many factors that are expected to affect audit 
opinions, there may be other variables that need to be controlled. Second, we use audit opinions 
clean versus qualified as the only indicator of audit quality. Future research may use a range of 
opinions based on the level of severity or another proxy for audit quality. However, to accomplish 
this, a larger sample size is necessary. Third, we use only three NERI sub-indexes to capture the 
institutional development of a province/region. Future research could test the robustness of the 
current study’s results by developing a more comprehensive measure of institutional development. 
Finally, our findings are based on data from a single country. Future research is warranted to 
determine whether the findings can be generalized to other transitional or developing economies. 
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